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451 
HOW STRICTER DUTCH IMMIGRATION 
POLICIES ARE CONTRIBUTING TO RISING 
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE 
NETHERLANDS AND EUROPE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Immigration is at the forefront of world issues, especially in the 
European Union (EU) in light of economic changes and recent world 
events.1 Previously long-standing traditions in EU countries such as 
democracy, tolerance, human rights, and fundamental freedoms supported 
inclusive and pro-immigration policies.2 Now these same countries are 
enacting stricter immigration policies for the new wave of immigrants, 
referred to as third country nationals (TCNs).3 These TCNs are ethnically 
and culturally different from previous immigrants.4 While changes in 
immigration policy are often made to address economic and security 
problems, they are also often the result of disguised racism and 
xenophobia.5 These policy changes are a reflection of the movement for 
 
 
 1. Barbara Melis, Negotiating Europe’s Immigration Frontiers, 3 IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM 
LAW AND POLICY IN EUROPE 1 (Elspeth Guild & Jan Niessen eds., 2001). 
 2. Id. at 8–9. The goal of inclusion is to integrate immigrants in the host countries. See id. at 18. 
 3. A TCN is a person who is not a national of an EU Member State. European Commission: 
Justice and Home Affairs, Glossary, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/glossary/wai/glossary_welcome 
_en.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). 
 4. Melis, supra note 1, at 18. The new group of TCNs come from developing countries farther 
away from Europe. As a result, they have less in common with “European” culture, especially 
regarding language and ethnicity, and are often considered non-European (especially if they are non-
white). See id. at 2. This is in sharp contrast to previous waves of immigrants from countries that were 
closer to Europe culturally and geographically. Id. at 2. 
 5. Id. at 2. Economics had always been one of the factors driving immigration. See id. at 10. 
Later immigration also sparked security concerns regarding terrorism and international crime. See id. 
at 11. See also 3 IAN WARD, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LAW 226 (2d ed. 2003) 
(discussing the immigrant guest worker problem and perceived threat to security brought on by 
immigration).  
 Melis discusses the difficulties of assimilating immigrants of non-European descent with the rise 
of right-wing parties pushing agendas with xenophobia and racism and general hostile attitudes toward 
foreigners. See generally Melis, supra note 1, at 15–18. 
 Several events have demonstrated the social and cultural gulf between Muslims and non-
Muslims. Anna Mulrine, Europe’s Identity Crisis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 10, 
2005, at 36. These events include the debate over EU membership for Turkey, the ban on 
head scarves in French schools, the commuter-train bombings in Madrid, and the murder of 
Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Id. More recent events include the July 2005 bombings in 
London and the controversy over the Danish and European publication of cartoons depicting 
Muhammad.  
See Nasreen Suleaman, The Mystery of ‘Sid,’ BBC NEWS, Oct. 19, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
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immigration exclusion.6 However, many of these new exclusionary 
immigration policies, such as those in the Netherlands, are effectuating 
discontent and exacerbating Islamic fundamentalism in Europe. 
Part II of this recent development discusses the history of immigration 
and immigration policies in the EU and the Netherlands. Part III discusses 
changes in EU attitudes toward immigration, subsequent changes in 
policy, as well as changes in Dutch immigration policy and the 
Netherlands’ move from a more inclusive to a more exclusive policy. Part 
IV discusses the effect of the changes in Dutch policy and their 
relationship to rising Islamic fundamentalism. Part V argues that the 
change in Dutch policy is a reflection of a general exclusionary 
immigration policy in the EU and its individual Member States, and that it 
further contribute to anti-inclusionary policies and rising Islamic 
fundamentalism in the EU.  
II. BACKGROUND/HISTORY 
A. EU Immigration Policy 
The EU arose from unification of the belligerent nations of World War 
II.7 While the nations made several agreements, they could not agree on a 
unified immigration policy.8  
 
 
uk_news/magazine/4354858.stm (discussing the London bombings); Arthur Bright, Firestorm over 
Danish Muhammad Cartoons Continues, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www. 
csmonitor.com/2006/0201/dailyUpdate.html (discussing the Danish Cartoons). 
 6. Melis, supra note 1, at 19. Exclusion is defined as the limiting of TCNs from all the benefits 
of immigration and citizenship. Id.  
 7. See CIA, European Union, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/geos/ee.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2006). The EU arose out of several treaties and 
communities. Id. After World War II, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed an eventual 
union of Europe. Id. In 1951, the Treaty of Paris created the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). Id. Its success led to the Treaties of Rome, which created the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Id. The six members 
of the treaty also began eliminating trade barriers among themselves by forming a common market. Id. 
In 1967, the ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM were formally merged into the European Community (EC), 
creating a single Commission, a single Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament (EP). Id. 
Several countries later joined the EC. Id. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht led to more cooperation in 
foreign and defense policy, in judicial and internal affairs, and in the creation of an economic and 
monetary union (including a common currency). Id. This further integration created the European 
Union. Id. 
 8. Melis, supra note 1, at 12–13. The Maastricht Treaty consisted of several agreements for the 
EU, but since the Member States could not agree on a single framework for immigration, there are 
scattered provisions throughout the treaty regarding immigration. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/9
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Social and economic factors influenced European immigration.9 After 
World War II, European governments encouraged immigration to help 
rebuild Europe.10 During the international recession in the 1970s, many 
countries tried to decrease immigration but failed.11 Governments adopted 
more restrictive measures and methods to reduce immigration.12 However, 
many of these measures failed to decrease immigration.13 The Single 
European Act in 1987 increased freedom of movement not only for 
European citizens but also for TCNs.14  
In 1989, the end of the Cold War increased concerns over rising 
immigration.15 Immigration became a bigger security matter, and countries 
realized the need for increased international cooperation.16 Traditionally, 
countries had focused on border policies to keep TCNs out as opposed to 
immigrant policies, which mainly affected immigrants already within the 
borders.17 As countries tightened up policies, they enforced their policies 
through intergovernmental cooperation rather than centralized action.18 
The principle of mutual recognition was applied to immigration and 
asylum law, meaning that states recognized each others’ decisions in 
immigration and asylum matters.19  
 
 
 9. Id. at 10. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. Countries tried to deal with the recession, caused by the oil crisis, by limiting labor 
permits in the hope that it would reduce the foreign population. Id. However, they failed as immigrants 
stayed and invited their families to join them. Id.  
 12. See Melis, supra note 1, at 10–11. The restrictive policies, which included stopping new 
immigrants at the border and the creation of other intergovernmental complications, increased illegal 
immigration, which also led to additional and more restrictive laws for migration. Id. Repatriation 
programs intended to give migrants incentive to return to their home countries had little success. Id. 
Forced removal of migrants was impossible due to political and humanitarian reasons. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. at 11. The Act was intended to remove internal frontiers among member states by 
1992. Id. However, the increased freedom of movement led to additional security concerns, as 
everyone, including potential immigrants, could move about more freely. Id.  
 15. Countries were especially concerned over increased immigration from former communist 
regimes. Id. at 12. 
 16. Id. Previously, immigration had been mainly an economic concern. Id. Countries realized the 
need for a more internationally coordinated effort to deal with rising immigration. Id. 
 17. Id. at 29. 
 18. Id. at 11–12. See also WARD, supra note 5, at 225 (discussing how immigration remains an 
intergovernmental concern among individual Member States despite the formal transfer of 
immigration matters to the EU).  
 19. See Steve Peers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Internal Market Model or Human Rights 
Model?, in 1 EUROPEAN UNION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
PUBLIC LAW EXTERNAL RELATIONS 345 (Takis Tridimas & Paolisa Nebbia eds., 2004). Mutual 
recognition, which requires one country to recognize another’s laws, has also been a core EU principle 
in other areas, including civil, commercial, and criminal law. Id.  
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The EU dealt with immigration on several fronts. The Maastricht 
Treaty set up a framework for intergovernmental cooperation in security 
and foreign policy (CFSP) and in justice and home affairs (JHA).20 The 
institutions created under the Maastricht Treaty had limited authority, if 
any, in immigration.21 Immigration matters, except for visas, were of 
common interest, but were not subject to European Community (EC) 
competence.22 Immigration was regulated under JHA, where member 
states had the most influence.23 The treaty adopted central immigration 
policies, but they were ineffective because the instruments enacted to 
implement the policies lacked legally binding force.24 Additionally there 
was no unified system to oversee immigration.25 Instead, Member States 
retained primary control on immigration matters.26 The Maastricht Treaty 
conferred increased political rights and free movement to European 
citizens.27 However, TCNs were still considered nothing more than labor 
or security threats and did not have the same rights as native citizens.28 
Criticism of the Maastricht approach to immigration29 led to revisions, and 
finally, the Amsterdam Treaty.30 
Member States in the Amsterdam Treaty (except for the U.K. and 
Denmark)31 called for a common understanding on immigration and a 
single framework of EC Treaty provisions.32 However, this still did not 
translate into a unified policy.33 The goal of unanimity rule failed to 
resolve the biggest migration issues, such as conditions of entry, residence, 
and family reunion, which were left up to Member States to decide and 
enforce.34  
 
 
 20. Melis, supra note 1, at 13. The treaty created a system of three pillars: (1) the European 
Community; (2) the CFSP; and (3) the JHA. The first pillar consisted of the Council (the Member 
States), the European Commission, and the European Parliament (EP). Id. 
 21. Id. The European Parliament had a consultative role while the European Court of Justice did 
not participate in immigration affairs. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 14. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 15. See also Treaty on the European Union art. 2, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224). 
 28. Melis, supra note 1, at 15. 
 29. The European Commission, European Parliament, and many Member States criticized the 
Maastricht Treaty for various reasons beyond the scope of this article. Id. at 13–14. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 14. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 14–15. Different countries have varied in their immigration policies depending on the 
types of immigrants and their countries of origin. Id. 
 34. Id. at 52. This was problematic because Member States often made and retained different and 
conflicting policies despite being aware of the importance of the unanimity of the EU. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/9
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The Amsterdam Treaty stated a deeper commitment to human rights in 
respect to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) than the 
Maastricht Treaty.35 However, the Amsterdam Treaty also created a virtual 
“fortress of Europe,” increasing the gap between EC migrants and TCN 
migrants, who were finding it next to impossible to become EU citizens 
and gain the rights associated with such citizenship.36 Thus, immigration 
policy moved toward racialization, usually affecting only “ethnic” TCNs 
in various ways that made immigration and integration more difficult.37  
Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Parliament (EP) and 
European Commission have sought increased freedoms for TCNs and a 
unified immigration policy.38 But such policies are limited by Member 
States’ reluctance to take action to integrate immigrants and their desire to 
decrease immigration.39  
There have been other movements toward a more unified immigration 
policy.40 The EC originally sought harmonization of national law to allow 
free movement (including that of persons) but ended up with the minimum 
standard of mutual recognition.41 The Treaty of Amsterdam—in regard to 
visas, asylum, immigration, and other policies related to the free 
movement of persons—implies that Member States may only introduce 
laws that are compatible with the Treaty and international law.42 The EC 
 
 
 35. Id. at 21–23. 
 36. See generally Steve Peers, Building Fortress Europe: The Development of EU Migration 
Law, 35 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1235, 1235–72 (1998) (discussing the creation of and problems 
associated with a “fortress of Europe” in regards to immigration).  
 37. See Melis, supra note 1, at 15–17. “Ethnic” TCNs usually have a distinct culture (regarding 
ethnicity, language, religion, etc.), which makes it more difficult for them to assimilate and integrate 
when compared to other immigrants from European or western countries. TCNs are also usually low-
skilled, which creates additional economic problems in the foreign country of destination. Id. For 
further discussion on the racialization of immigration policy, see also WARD, supra note 5, at 226–31. 
 38. See Melis, supra note 1, at 17. The Commission, and especially the EP, have pushed for 
increased rights for immigrants, while individual states have advocated for measures to control or 
decrease immigration. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Peers, supra note 19, at 346–48. Recent efforts include the Tampere European Council of 
1999, which called for adopting common standards on asylum procedures and granting more uniform 
rights to TCNs. Id. at 346–47. The Treaty of Nice also added article 67(5) to shorten the transitional 
period for asylum measures. Id. at 347. The EC has adopted legislation “defining the common rules 
and basic principles governing these issues.” Id. 
 41. Id. at 346. The standard of mutual recognition being that of “preventing Member States from 
limiting free movement where another Member State has already regulated a person, product, or 
service.” Id. 
 42. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 63, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 61 
[hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty]. Article 63 states that the EC “shall not prevent any Member State 
from maintaining or introducing in the areas concerned national provisions which are compatible with 
this Treaty and international agreements.” Id.  
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can only adopt “minimum standards” to asylum law,43 usually for the 
protection of the individual.44 The changes in the Treaty, which included 
the abolishment of internal border checks and freedom for TCNs to travel 
for three-month periods in some countries, may have indicated some 
relaxation in policies.45  
But ultimately, these measures did not result in the increased 
harmonization of asylum and immigration policy in the EU.46 Member 
States were required to set minimum standards for illegal migration, but 
optional harmonization allowed them to increase regulation on free 
movement rights within their territories.47 Member States may have 
minimum standards and can be more restrictive than other Member States, 
making full harmonization impossible.48 While some Member States may 
provide more protection for immigrants, other Member States are not 
obligated to recognize such protection.49 As a result, Member States can 
maintain more exclusive policies despite the EU’s movement toward more 
unified, and less restrictive policies. 
The Schengen Instruments,50 which were eventually adopted into the 
Amsterdam Treaty, are another extension of the harmonization process.51 
They were originally created to promote free movement across Member 
States.52 The Schengen Instruments attempted to harmonize standards for 
crossing borders in the EU and create a uniform visa procedure for free 
movement among Member States.53 Member States are now in agreement 
in some areas, including the “white list”54 of countries exempt from the 
visa requirement, the uniform visa and visa procedures, required 
 
 
 43. Peers, supra note 19, at 346. 
 44. Id. at 351. 
 45. Id. at 356. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 351–52. 
 48. Id. at 356–57. When countries have different standards, countries with less restrictive 
standards often end up having to conform to the standards of more restrictive countries. Id. 
 49. Id. at 358–59. 
 50. These instruments are also referred to as the Schengen Agreement and Convention. WARD, 
supra note 5, at 195. The instruments were eventually adopted into the Amsterdam Treaty despite 
earlier objections from some countries. Id. at 196. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 195. Other Schengen goals included streamlining visa procedures, creating databases of 
movement, and other methods of monitoring the movement of people (especially immigrants). Id. 
 53. See Peers, supra note 19, at 348–49. The Schengen Executive Committee had the power to 
adopt common rules for visa applications and criteria for movement within the Schengen area (for 
Member States who signed on). Member States were allowed to adopt a common policy on movement 
of persons and lists of countries that were exempt and non-exempt from visa requirements. Id. 
 54. The “white list” is a list of countries whose nationals do not have to obtain a visa before 
entering the EU. Id. at 349. 
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documentation for persons from unrecognized territories, the “freedom to 
travel” list, and standard refusals of entry.55 Agreement in these areas was 
the result of Member States’ realization of the need for a unified policy to 
stem the flow of TCNs.56  
The Dublin Convention (Dublin Regulation)57 was created in response 
to the Schengen-created problem of asylum shopping.58 The Dublin 
Regulation gave one nation the responsibility of reviewing an individual 
asylum application, solving the problem of “refugees in orbit.”59 It 
established a system for mutual recognition of rejection of asylum 
applications in accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.60  
In 2001, the European Council hoped to adopt the Action Plan to 
combat illegal immigration.61 The EU encouraged adoption of the Action 
Plan to facilitate the goal of free movement.62 The EU recommended the 
adoption of a common policy on immigration and asylum as well as more 
effective control of external borders.63  
B. Dutch Immigration Policy 
In contrast to EU policy, Dutch immigration policy and treatment of 
foreigners is considered open and tolerant.64 The Netherlands’ open and 
 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Immigrants were once able to skirt strict border controls in some countries by entering the 
EU through other countries with more lax border policies and eventually entering the more restrictive 
countries (since borders between countries became more lax with little or no border checks or barriers, 
especially after the passing of the Amsterdam Treaty). 
 57. Catherine Phuong, Persecution by Third Parties and European Harmonization of Asylum 
Policies, 16 IMMIGR. L.J. 81, 90 (2001). The Dublin Convention is another EU asylum instrument. 
 58. Id. Asylum shopping is defined as the ability of asylum seekers to move freely among 
Member States and file asylum applications in multiple states to increase their chances of being 
granted asylum. Id. 
 59. Id. at 90–91. “Refugees in orbit” was a situation where TCNs who wanted to immigrate were 
left stateless because countries would refuse or take too long to examine asylum applications. Id. 
Countries would try to rely on another country to examine the application. See id. Now, a Member 
State is assigned to review the application. See id. 
 60. Peers, supra note 19, at 349–50. This policy was based on complete confidence in the 
Member States and assumed they would fully apply the Geneva Convention and European Convention 
on Human Rights to asylum applications. Id. 
 61. European Council, Presidency Conclusions: European Council in Laeken, Dec. 14–15, 2001, 
at 12, available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/68827.pdf (last visited Mar. 
8, 2006). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Isabelle Wesselingh, Traditional Dutch Tolerance Confronts Harsh Realities of 
Integration, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 11, 2004.  
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tolerant policy may be due partly to the fact that the country has always 
had a large immigrant population.65  
The Dutch Constitution has long been the basis of immigration policy. 
However, even though the Constitution offers basic principles to interpret 
the law, judicial and local government organization and powers are 
actually derived from Acts of Parliament.66 The Constitution is rigid but 
flexible enough for much leeway in rulemaking.67 Constitutional review is 
only subject to international law norms.68  
Article 2 of the Constitution covers nationality and the admission and 
expulsion of aliens.69 Nationality is granted through parentage or 
naturalization through birth.70 The Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet)71 gave 
few rights to aliens and allowed immediate expulsion of aliens in certain 
circumstances.72 However, the country cannot refuse admittance to all 
refugees.73 
Since the Treaty of Rome, the Netherlands has followed EC law and 
has allowed the European Court of Justice to limit its sovereignty.74 
Primary and secondary EC law prevails over Dutch law, even the 
Constitution.75 International law is usually automatically adopted into 
Dutch law.76 
 
 
 65. See Ken Dilanian, Dutch Pull Back Welcome Mat, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 30, 
2004, at A2. 
 66. CONSTANTIJN A.J.M. KORTMANN & PAUL P.T. BOVEND’EERT, DUTCH CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 20–21, 31 (2000). 
 67. Id. at 29. Many concepts in the Dutch Constitution are open to interpretation. Id. Dutch 
governmental bodies have been able to make many major changes to laws without having to revise the 
Constitution. Id. The government, the States General, and the courts have also been able to easily 
adjust constitutional interpretations for different circumstances left open by the Constitution. Id. at 20–
21. Governmental bodies have often taken the initiative to make regulations rather than be directed by 
the Constitution. Id. at 31. 
 68. Id. at 21. There is no official body authorized to review laws against the Constitution. The 
“political” offices, government, and States General involved in making the laws are responsible for 
conducting constitutional review. Id. Article 120 forbids courts from reviewing the constitutionality of 
Acts of Parliament and treaties. Id. at 206. Article 94 in the Constitution forbids courts and officials 
from applying national laws when doing so would contravene treaties or international organizations. 
Id. at 203. Thus it is usually international law that merits more significant constitutional review.  
 69. Id. at 141. 
 70. Id. Naturalization applies to foreigners born in the Netherlands or its colonies. Id. 
 71. Vreemdelingenwet, Wet van januari 1965 [The Aliens Act, Act 13 January 1965], Staatsblad 
van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 40 (Neth.). 
 72. KORTMANN & BOVEND’EERT, supra note 66, at 143–44. Aliens have some recourse and can 
seek expulsion review from the Minister of Justice or the district court of the Hague. Id. 
 73. Id. at 143. The country must admit refugees who otherwise would have to return and would 
be threatened with persecution in their home country. Id. 
 74. Id. at 151. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. The Netherlands follows the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/9
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III. MAIN TOPIC 
A. Factors Behind Changing Sentiments on Immigration 
Recently, the Netherlands has been moving towards a “closed” 
immigration policy.77 This more exclusionary policy is reflective of the 
current attitude of the EU towards immigration and will continue the 
general EU exclusionary trend unfavorable to immigration, despite human 
rights and humanitarian considerations.  
The EU faces a myriad of problems related to immigration, including 
security concerns and the need for social cohesion.78 Social cohesion is 
becoming more difficult as immigrants arrive from countries drastically 
different from Europe.79 Some areas are facing economic problems 
attributed to immigration.80 Xenophobia, racism, and related problems are 
increasing in Europe.81  
The EU has kept these concerns in mind as it has pushed for a stronger 
integration policy.82 This policy includes the promotion of civic 
citizenship and nationality for immigrants and schooling in new 
languages.83 The need for active integration is stronger due to shifts in the 
type of immigration and the different arriving immigrants today.84 The 
 
 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id. These treaties call for fundamental 
rights of all persons. Id. They are automatically adopted into Dutch law and often have the same 
weight as the Constitution. Id. The country also recognizes the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Human Rights Committee. Id. 
 When international law heavily conflicts with Dutch law or the Constitution, a rule-making 
authority may need to implement the provision or reconcile the more complicated international law 
with the conflicting Dutch law or the Constitution. Id. at 173. 
 77. See generally Dilanian, supra note 65 (discussing how the Netherlands, an extremely 
multiethnic nation, is enacting strict immigration laws). 
 78. See generally Theodora Kostakopoulou, "Integrating" Non-EU Migrants in the European 
Union: Ambivalent Legacies and Mutating Paradigms, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 181, 188 (2002). 
 79. See Melis, supra note 1, at 15–17. 
 80. See generally Special Report: Forget Asylum-Seekers: It’s the People Inside Who Count, 
THE ECONOMIST, May 10, 2003, at 23 [hereinafter People Inside] (discussing immigration and 
economic problems such as welfare and job loss).  
 Economic problems attributed to immigrants include worries that immigrants take away jobs 
from citizens because of their willingness to work for lower wages and fear that immigrants tax many 
European countries’ general social welfare systems and other scarce resources such as housing. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Justice and Home Affairs: Commission Sets Guidelines for Integrating Immigrants, 
EUROPEAN REPORT, June 4, 2003, § 2781 [hereinafter Justice and Home Affairs]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. People Inside, supra note 80, at 23–24. The other option to integration, natural assimilation, 
has been considered largely unsuccessful. Id. Natural assimilation had been successful in the past, but 
not today because there are more immigrants entering at faster rates. Id. These immigrants are different 
from previous groups of immigrants. Id. They face more obvious prejudice, are more likely to resent 
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new EU goals for immigration call for increased immigrant rights and 
harmonized entry procedures into the EU,85 yet doubts remain as to 
whether EU regulation and encouragement has been successful.86 In 
addition, there are still human rights concerns.87 Many have argued that 
EU regulation has actually established systematic exclusion in the 
community.88 
The Netherlands is illustrative of internal and EU divisions in 
immigration policy. The Netherlands was once seen as a tolerant, open 
society;89 however, world events have revealed divisions within the 
country, especially with respect to the Muslim population.90 The 
Netherlands’ reversal on immigration has been the most dramatic in the 
EU.91 
There were many reasons for the changes in sentiment and policy in the 
Netherlands. The Dutch feared a loss of national identity,92 and blamed 
 
 
prejudice, and are less able to assimilate into society. Id. 
 85. Justice and Home Affairs, supra note 82. The Commission-recommended approach to 
immigration in Member States called for integration as a two-way process based on mutual rights and 
corresponding obligations, while considering their individual situations. Id. Integration was most 
important for the following: language; housing and urban issues; increased access to health and social 
services; and encouragement of involvement in the community. Id. 
 86. WARD, supra note 5, at 227. 
 87. Id. One human rights concern is the criminalization of asylum, considering the huge number 
of asylum seekers who are actually escaping persecution. Id.  
 88. Id. Such systematic exclusion is due to the continued stress on security and the EU’s 
continued allowance of several suspect immigration policies in Member States. Id. The importance of 
security in the EU may have actually given members justification to enact more exclusionary 
immigration policies in the name of security and protection. Id. 
 89. It is unclear how tolerant the Netherlands was in actuality, because there was a lot of 
segregation. Stryker McGuire, Clash of Civilizations; Europeans Talk of Ethnic Tolerance. But Events 
in the Netherlands Show How Dangerously They Are Divided, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Nov. 22, 2004, at 36 
(discussing the internal divisions among the Dutch population and the divisions between the 
immigrants and native-born of immigrants).  
 Dutch society was based on a “mosaic” (as opposed to a “melting-pot”) notion of integration. Id. 
Different religions such as Protestants and Catholics had different churches, schools, and social clubs, 
but lived in mutual respect as Dutch. Id. The government funded religious Islamic schools that isolated 
immigrants from Dutch life and did not encourage newcomers to learn the language or customs upon 
arrival. Id. This created “ghettoes of discontent” as job prospects soured for new immigrants who were 
unable to compete with native citizens and were isolated economically and literally from the general 
population. Id.  
 90. People Inside, supra note 80, at 22. After September 11, many Dutch were shocked to learn 
that only sixty-one percent of Dutch Muslims condemned the attacks. Id. at 23. As a result there was 
rising sentiment that many of the immigrants did not share Dutch values. Id. Polls also showed rising 
Dutch sentiment against Muslims and immigration in general. Id.  
 91. Dilanian, supra note 65. See also infra notes 117–24 and accompanying text.  
 92. Dilanian, supra note 65. There was a movement stressing return to the traditional normen en 
warden (norms and values) of the Dutch. People Inside, supra note 80, at 22. This movement stressed 
the importance of purely Dutch norms and values. Id. 
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rising Islamic extremism for increased violence and crime.93 Citizens also 
feared that newcomers were taking advantage of the social welfare 
system.94 Pim Fortuyn,95 an assassinated former right-wing leader, rose to 
prominence amid these fears.96 His party’s slogan, “Holland is full,” won 
his party97 twenty percent of the vote during the elections, drastically 
changing the political climate.98 Since then, immigration has become a 
more divisive problem.99 
B. Changes in Dutch Immigration Policy  
The Dutch response to the immigration problem has created new 
barriers to immigration.100 A rule was recently enacted that requires future 
residents (as opposed to citizens) to pass a Dutch language and culture 
(Inburgering) test before arriving in Holland, making it the first country in 
the world to demand that permanent residents complete a pre-arrival 
integration course.101 A local council oversees and tracks the individual 
 
 
 93. Dilanian, supra note 65. Immigrants such as Muslims, Turks, and Moroccans are expected to 
become majorities in a decade in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Id. These major cities have had huge 
problems with crime. Id. Much of the crime is blamed on the immigrants in the city. Id. Since 
September 11, 2001, there has been increased attention and hostility when those perceived as 
immigrants commit crimes. Id. 
 94. Id. The welfare system, which is considered generous, is currently undergoing problems 
because of declining native birthrates (necessary to support the pensions) and increasing need for 
welfare support by immigrants. Id. Immigrants, especially from Turkey and Morocco, make up a 
disproportionate amount of the population imprisoned, unemployed, or on disability. Id. Once 
immigrants become residents (not necessarily citizens), they can apply for social welfare benefits. Id. 
 95. Fortuyn was a gay former sociology professor who launched the movement opposing what he 
viewed as overly generous Dutch immigration policies. Id. In 2002, an animal-rights activist 
assassinated him during his campaign for prime minister. Id. His party is still a powerful force in the 
country. Id. While his party was ousted by the Labour Party in recent elections in its stronghold of 
Rotterdam, the Labour Party and many other political parties have adopted many of Fortuyn’s policies 
on immigration and security. See Dutch Politics: Left Back, THE ECONOMIST, May 9, 2006, at 27. 
 96. Dilanian, supra note 65. 
 97. Fortuyn’s right-wing party called itself “Livable Netherlands.” Peter Speetjens, Van Gogh’s 
Murder Brings Out Holland’s Contradictions, THE DAILY STAR, Nov. 20, 2004.  
 98. Id. Before Fortuyn’s party came on the scene, a coalition of Christian Democrats, Labor, and 
Liberal parties had dominated the political climate. Id. Fortuyn’s party is the largest political party in 
Rotterdam, Holland’s second largest city. Id. Rotterdam also has a high concentration of immigrants. 
Dilanian, supra note 65. Currently, the party is promoting several policies purportedly to help 
immigrants integrate but are in actuality evidence of anti-immigrant policies. People Inside, supra note 
80. 
 99. McGuire, supra note 89.  
 100. See Dilanian, supra note 65. See also infra notes 126–34 and accompanying text.  
 101. Dilanian, supra note 65. Most countries with such requirements require aspiring citizens to 
take courses after arrival in the country and during the citizenship process, not before. Id. Those who 
desire to be residents must take the course even though they have no guarantee of citizenship. Id. 
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integration of residents and fines them for failing to integrate.102 Another 
obstacle for immigrants is increasing residence permit fees.103 Major cities 
are considering proposals that would require certain income levels before 
allowing residents to move there.104 
Earlier immigration laws are now more strictly enforced. The law has 
also been tightened with regard to immigration for employment and 
marriage.105 The government is using more foreign police and has 
increased crackdowns on the hiring of and renting to illegal immigrants.106  
Asylum procedures are becoming harsher. Accelerated procedures to 
review asylum cases are increasingly used.107 This has resulted in unfair 
treatment of unaccompanied minors from outside the EU. They are given 
less leeway, although they are already at a disadvantage upon arrival.108 
The Netherlands is also trying to expel 26,000 people who were allowed to 
stay after their asylum applications were rejected.109 
IV. EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN DUTCH POLICY 
Stricter Dutch policy is indicative of a general trend in other countries 
and the EU in general.110 The Netherlands, despite its small size,111 is an 
influential EU member.112 This constitutional monarchy113 has a 
 
 
 102. People Inside, supra note 80, at 23. 
 103. Dutch Groups Go to Court Over “Extreme Costs” of Residence Permit, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, Nov. 19, 2004. Residence permits (required to reside in Holland) now cost 430 euros, up from 
56 euros three years ago. Id. Extensions, which used to be free, now cost 285 euros. Id. In addition, 
permanent residence permits used to cost 256 euros and are now 890 euros. Id. These costs are 
especially harmful to immigrants who are generally on the lower end of the income scale. Id.  
 104. McGuire, supra note 89, at 36.  
 105. It is now easier for skilled workers to gain residency in the Netherlands. Id. This does not 
help most TCNs who are unskilled. In immigration policy regarding marriage, citizens must now earn 
120% of minimum wage before they are allowed to bring a foreign partner to the country. Id. Those 
who wish to bring in relatives or a spouse must be older. Roger Cohen, A European Model for 
Immigration Falters; Dutch Facade of Tolerance Under Strain; Islam in Europe, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Oct. 17, 2005, at 1.  
 106. McGuire, supra note 89, at 36.  
 107. Dilanian, supra note 65. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See generally People Inside, supra note 80, at 24 (discussing the changes in other EU 
countries with more restrictions on immigration and immigrants in general, such as France). 
 111. KORTMANN & BOVEND’EERT, supra note 66, at 23. The territory is 41,160 square kilometers 
and largely flat, with few natural resources (making it a large exporter of agricultural goods). Id. 
 112. CIA: The World Factbook, Netherlands, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
geos/nl.html (last updated Aug 22, 2006). The Netherlands has been heavily involved in the EU and its 
predecessor communities. Id. It was a founding member of NATO and the EC (now the EU), and 
participated in the introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. Id. 
 113. KORTMANN & BOVEND’EERT, supra note 66, at 21–23. The Netherlands is a decentralized 
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population of 16 million, including a large number of foreigners.114 With 
five percent of the population being Muslim, the Netherlands has the 
second highest proportion of Muslims in the European Union; only France 
has a higher percentage.115 The Muslim population is mainly Turkish and 
Moroccan, with a number of smaller minority groups.116  
Recent events and changes in policy have exacerbated the immigration 
and integration problems.117 A parliamentary report showed that past 
integration had generally been successful, based on interviews with 
hundreds of people and a large study.118 But recent events have led to a 
different conclusion.119 As the policies are tightened, there is more open 
opposition to “foreigners” and their ways. “[F]oreigners become resentful, 
find it harder to integrate not only socially but economically, and there are 
more problems, including increased violence by and against 
immigrants.”120 A recent poll demonstrated increasingly anti-immigrant 
 
 
unitary state with legislative and administrative functions exercised at the central, regional, and local 
level. The central government controls national matters such as defense, foreign affairs, and justice. Id. 
The central government is a constitutional monarchy with a parliament, the King, who has immunity, 
and the ministers, who actually make policy. Id.  
 The Constitution was adopted in 1814 but has been amended many times, most recently in 2002. 
CIA: The World Factbook, Netherlands, supra note 112. The country has a civil law system 
incorporating French penal theory. Id. The Constitution does not permit judicial review of acts of the 
States General. Id.  
 The Netherlands accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations. Id. These include the rule 
of law (rechtsstaat), which states that there must be review by the courts (except in constitutional 
matters), adherence to fundamental rights in the Constitution and international treaties on protection of 
human rights, trias politicas (separation of powers), and a system of checks and balances. KORTMANN 
& BOVEND’EERT, supra note 66, at 22. In addition, actions must be based on previous rules. Id. 
 114. The makeup of the population in ethnicity and religion is as follows: Dutch 83%; other 17% 
(of which 9% are of non-Western origin; mainly Turks; Moroccans; Antilleans; Surinamese and 
Indonesians) (1999 est.). Religious affiliations include: Roman Catholic 31%; Dutch Reformed 13%; 
Calvinist 7%; Muslim 5.5%; other 2.5%; unaffiliated 41% (2002). CIA: The World Factbook, 
Netherlands, supra note 112. 
 115. Paul Schnabel, The Dutch Experience with Islam, THE AUSTRALIAN, Nov. 22, 2005, at 12. 
 116. Id. These smaller groups are composed of mainly refugees from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, the 
former Yugoslavia, and Somalia. Id. 
 117. Measures seen as anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim include publishing a code of conduct 
requiring Dutch to be spoken in public in Rotterdam, and the Parliament legislating a countrywide ban 
on wearing the burqa in public. Stefan Theil, The End of Tolerance, NEWSWEEK INT’L, Mar. 6, 2006, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11569485/site/newsweek/ (last viewed Sept. 4, 2006). The 
publication of cartoons featuring the prophet Muhammad throughout Europe incited anger in many 
Muslims. Id.  
 118. Wesselingh, supra note 64. 
 119. See Schnabel, supra note 115. Immigration ministers in the Netherlands, France, and 
Germany have admitted to failures in integration policy. See Theil, supra note 117. 
 120. Speetjens, supra note 97. Muslims who feel isolated from Dutch society increasingly turn 
inward to their communities and are less motivated to advance economically because of real and 
perceived bias against them. Id. The murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, maker of a film 
widely seen as anti-Muslim, was committed by a Muslim Moroccan native born in the Netherlands and 
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sentiment and an increased call for integration.121 Right-wing politicians 
have called for an end to non-Western immigration.122  
The Dutch have acted to exclude foreigners as well as failed to include 
foreigners, especially Muslims.123 While the EU has also taken measures 
to restrict immigration, the Netherlands has gone beyond EU policy and 
that of other Member States. The EU has encouraged policies to assist 
immigrants financially and socially, but almost nothing in Dutch policy 
does so.124 Immigrants are losing valuable welfare benefits and support.125 
The EU desires free movement, which the Netherlands impedes directly 
and indirectly through its policies.  
For a variety of reasons, including the immigration problems, Islamic 
fundamentalism is on the rise in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe;126 
however, it is distinct from the Islamic fundamentalism associated with 
terrorism.127 While there have been isolated incidents of involvement with 
well-known international terrorist groups and major incidents of violence, 
a majority of fundamentalists in Europe are more likely to engage in petty 
crime, resulting in short jail sentences.128 The rioting in France that took 
place after two Muslim youths were killed while evading police is but one 
example.129 Despite this distinction, there is evidence that these 
fundamentalists are being absorbed into the ranks of those associated with 
terrorist networks.130 Many of these new fundamentalists, including new 
converts to Islam, have become “an intense focus of terrorist networks.”131 
Fundamentalist ideas were not popular in the first generation of 
Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands.132 While the Turkish population 
 
 
illustrates the growing division. Id. After the murder, many mosques and Muslim schools were set 
ablaze or vandalized. Id. This incited retaliatory attacks on Protestant Churches. Id. Antiterror police 
also uncovered a plot to kill the woman who had written van Gogh’s film. Id. 
 121. The poll showed that forty percent of Dutch people hoped that the 900,000 Muslims would 
“no longer feel at home” in the Netherlands, and that eighty percent of the Dutch called for harsher 
measures to force immigrants to integrate. Wesselingh, supra note 64.  
 122. See Cohen, supra note 105, at 1.  
 123. See Dilanian, supra note 65. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Theil, supra note 117. See also Martin Walker, Europe’s Migrant Elephant, UNITED 
PRESS INT’L, Dec. 18, 2005 (discussing Europe’s growing problems with Muslim immigration). 
 127. Michael Radu, They Burn, Therefore They Are, NAT’L REVIEW, Nov. 14, 2005. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. See TONY BLANKLEY, THE WEST’S LAST CHANCE 50–56 (2005) (discussing recruiting and 
indoctrinating European Muslims into terrorist networks or jihad by various terrorist groups, including 
Al-Qaeda).  
 131. GILLES KEPEL, THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS: ISLAM AND THE WEST 243 (2004). 
 132. Schnabel, supra note 115, at 12. 
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seems not to be as heavily influenced by fundamentalists, many second 
and later generations of Moroccans are turning to fundamentalist ideas.133 
These people are born and educated in the Netherlands.134 However, they 
turn to Islamic fundamentalism for a variety of reasons, including 
alienation from their parents, their country of origin, and the society in 
which they live.135 Searching for an identity, these youths have turned to 
gangs and/or Islamic fundamentalism.136 While the level of criminal 
activity varies, it does indicate that integration is not working. The 
bombings in London and riots in France also indicate rising levels of 
violence by fundamentalists.  
After Fortuyn’s murder, other violent incidents, and the anti-Muslim 
stances adopted by some politicians, several government buildings are 
under strict surveillance and many security checks are in place.137 
Politicians who have spoken out against or have been perceived as against 
Islam have been under heavy protection as a result of credible threats.138 
Many Muslims sense a growing hostility toward them both from the 
government and the people.139  
V. ANALYSIS  
EU Member States have heavily influenced EU policy, and the 
Netherlands, though small in comparison to other Member States, is an EU 
powerhouse that has exerted significant influence as an active participant 
in community institutions. The Court of Justice is located in the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands is also near other countries, such as 
Germany and Belgium, that house several other European institutions with 
authority or influence over the immigration policy of the EU and its 
Member States. To date, however, these institutions have done little to 
curtail the more exclusive policies in the Netherlands, even though these 
policies thwart EU goals. 
The Netherlands will be able to adopt more restrictive policies because 
of recent world events.140 Security has always been a major concern and 
 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Radu, supra note 127. Problems like high unemployment and racism also are factors. Id. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Schnabel, supra note 115, at 12.  
 138. See Theil, supra note 117. Dutch Integration Minister Rita Verdonk is one of several top 
politicians under death threats from Islamists. Id. 
 139. See Alan Cowell, A ‘Dangerous Moment’ for Europe and Islam, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, 
Feb. 8, 2006, at 1. 
 140. These events include September 11 and concerns over Islamic fundamentalists. See generally 
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justification for decreasing immigration.141 Concerns over security will 
give member states free reign to enact stricter policies on immigration and 
control of foreigners.142 The Constitution and courts are powerless or 
refuse to clamp down on immigration restrictions, whether on the basis of 
human rights, fundamental rights, or constitutionality.  
The Netherlands was previously another alternative for immigrants. 
Now that the country is trying to restrict its borders, there is little 
possibility of increased immigrant rights in the Netherlands or in the EU.  
The Netherlands experience has shown that badly managed 
immigration policies can be a destabilizing force even in the most tolerant 
and settled of European countries.143 The situation can only worsen for 
immigrants as worries about terrorism and discoveries of links between 
some Muslims and terrorist groups increase.144 The Netherlands’ response 
has been to toughen immigration policies, encourage integration and 
assimilation, and shut down some Muslim media outlets.145 Some of these 
actions are shrouded under the rubric of fighting terrorism.146 It is 
becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between anti-immigrant and 
anti-terrorist policies, and immigrants will clearly suffer. Despite attempts 
to integrate the foreigners and their children into mainstream society, 
many in the Netherlands still view immigrants as outsiders, causing many 
of the “native born” to join fundamentalists groups after “rejection” from 
society.147 While most Islamic fundamentalists are only engaged in “petty 
crimes,” there are indications that they may increase their level of activity 
and violence, as demonstrated by the riots in France and similar 
incidents.148 This could escalate into even more radicalized Islamic 
fundamentalism.149  
 
 
McGuire, supra note 89, at 36.  
 141. See WARD, supra note 5, at 225–28. See generally McGuire, supra note 89, at 36.  
 142. WARD, supra note 5, at 225–28. 
 143. McGuire, supra note 89, at 36.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. 
 147. See Cowell, supra note 139, at 2 (discussing the mistrust between native Europeans and 
native and non-native Muslims who feel they are viewed as potential insurgents and feel that they are 
victims of Islamophobia and discrimination in housing, jobs, and social status). See also generally 
Mulrine, supra note 5, at 36. In a recent poll by the Islamic Human Rights Commission, eighty percent 
of Muslims reported feeling harassed and discriminated against, up from thirty-five percent in 1999. 
Mulrine, supra note 5, at 36. 
 148. Other incidents include the protests and violence over the publication of Danish cartoons of 
Muhammad and subsequent reprinting by other European newspapers. See Richard Woods & David 
Leppard, How Liberal Britain Let Hate Flourish, SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at 12 (discussing 
Islamic fundamentalists who have been inciting major violence in Europe). 
 149. See Islamic Extremism in Europe: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Europe and Emerging 
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The Netherlands, once a model of tolerance, has now become another 
model for countries in the region, a glimpse of what their countries might 
become.150 While their populations of immigrants and Muslims are 
smaller,151 other Member States are experiencing increased immigration 
and integration problems.152 Many countries are imitating the Netherlands’ 
policies on immigration and integration.153 While EU institutions could 
attempt to change this tide, history and other factors have shown that this 
will be difficult, if not impossible. 
With the Netherland’s effect on immigration in neighboring countries, 
entry of additional Member States to the EU,154 and increasing security 
and economic concerns, the EU may well be moving towards a policy of 
exclusion of immigrants, while at the same time pushing for inclusion of 
additional countries into its fold. Ironically, while the EU seeks to include 
more countries, it is also excluding others from the benefits of EU 
citizenship, at the huge cost of rising Islamic fundamentalism.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The EU desires a more integrative and inclusionary policy on 
immigration but lacks the institutional power to implement this. Instead 
the EU must rely on its Member States. The Netherlands, once a safe 
haven for immigrants and a model of the inclusionary ideals the EU seeks, 
is changing its policy and excluding immigrants, physically and culturally. 
The Netherlands is indicative of the anti-immigrant sentiment and 
 
 
Threats of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 22 (2005) (discussing the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Europe and emerging security threat to the world).  
 150. McGuire, supra note 89 at 36.  
 151. There are an estimated one million Muslims in the Netherlands while the Muslim population 
in the EU is estimated at five percent. Cowell, supra note 139, at 3. If Turkey joins the EU, the Muslim 
population could be twenty percent by 2050. Mulrine, supra note 5, at 36. 
 152. McGuire, supra note 89, at 36. It is argued that it is not the number of Muslims or 
immigrants that is causing the problem, but the speed of their population growth. Id. This means other 
countries may experience similar problems though their populations of immigrants, compared to the 
general population, are smaller. Id. For example, France is currently experiencing integration problems 
with its Muslim community. Id. The increasing Muslim population is also in sharp contrast to Europe’s 
native population decrease. See Mulrine, supra note 5, at 36. 
 153. Notable among these countries are Germany and France, two huge and powerful countries in 
the EU. German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schuble has called on the country to adopt the more 
muscular “Dutch Way” in its immigration policy, though the country is also working to improve 
education for immigrants. In March 2006, France revealed new immigration law that is a virtual copy 
of many Dutch regulations, including “assimilability” testing and deportation for those who do not 
respect “western” values. See Theil, supra note 117.  
 154. Most notably, Muslim Turkey. Much of the debate on its entry into the EU has been centered 
on Islam. Mulrine, supra note 5, at 36. 
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exclusionary policy of other EU Member States. Its rising problem with 
Islamic fundamentalists as a result of its policies does not bode well for  
the rest of the EU, which is receiving an increasing number of Muslim 
immigrants and dealing with increasing and more complicated Islamic 
fundamentalist conflicts.  
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